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Abstract
We investigate the applicability of the formalism of quantum mechanics to ev-
eryday life. It seems to be directly relevant for situations in which the very act
of coming to a conclusion or decision on one issue affects one’s confidence about
conclusions or decisions on another issue. Lie algebra theory is argued to be a very
useful tool in guiding the construction of quantum descriptions of such situations.
Tests, extensions and speculative applications and implications, including for the
encoding of thoughts in neural networks, are discussed. It is suggested that the
recognition and incorporation of such mathematical structure into machine learning
and artificial intelligence might lead to significant efficiency and generality gains in
addition to ensuring probabilistic reasoning at a fundamental level.
1 Introduction
Bayesian inference, as espoused by e.g. Jaynes in [1], is the logical way to associate real
numbers with plausibilities of propositions. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand,
requires complex numbers on its way to prediction about the physical world. Many
have speculated on what quantum theory is telling us about reality, see e.g. Penrose [2],
Deutsch [3] and Aaronson [4], and whether it can be thought of as an improvement or
extension of probability theory/bayesian inference in some way, see e.g. [5, 6, 7].
This paper takes the point of view that the structure of quantum mechanics is indeed
an extension to bayesian inference. As such, there should be “real-world” situations for
which the quantum formalism provides a good way to describe them. We actively seek
out some examples and then go on to draw some implications.
One of the hallmark features of quantum mechanics is the Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle, expressing the fact that measuring some property of a physical system typically
disturbs the system. Another is the fact that certain variables are “quantized”, or can
only ever be measured to have one of a discrete set of values.
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The first feature finds expression in quantum mechanics by the representation of
dynamical variables by matrices that do not necessarily commute with each other. The
second feature finds expression by the result of measuring the dynamical variable only
being an eigenvalue of the corresponding matrix, of which there are a finite number
(when the matrix is finite-dimensional).
Thus we expect quantum reasoning in the everyday world will be of benefit for
situations in which coming to a conclusion about some thing affects one’s conclusions
about other things and in which only a limited number of outcomes are possible.
In related work, mathematical psychologists have speculated whether the brain might
be well-modelled as reasoning in a quantum fashion; see [8] for an introduction to this
field. Our point of departure here is with the recognition of the potential of Lie alge-
bra theory, see e.g. [9], to act as an ordering principle in the construction of quantum
descriptions.
In physics the appreciation of symmetry has led, to take just two examples, to the
Standard Model description of nature (see e.g. [10]), in which particles are grouped into
families and are precisely related to one another, and to the celebrated Wigner-Eckart
Theorem (see e.g. [11]), which allows one to relate whole classes of expectation values of
quantities between pairs of states to one another by rotational symmetry alone.
To set the scene, we first discuss a classic experiment demonstrating the necessity of
a quantum description of nature. Next, we review the mathematics of quantum theory
and of Lie algebras. Then, we walk through a simple example involving choosing a drink
at a restaurant to show how the formalism might all apply. After this we discuss simple
tests of and extensions to the scheme, and then we close with some hopefully-entertaining
speculation on what these kinds of ideas might imply for the understanding of thought
and for the development of machine learning and artificial intelligence.
2 Lessons from Stern-Gerlach
This section discusses an archetypal example of a quantum mechanical behaviour in the
physical world. Our discussion stresses more than most the effects of one measurement
on the results of the next measurement, and might be of primary interest to physicist
readers. For non-physicists, hopefully enough of a flavour of the rationale for quantum
mechanics will come through to enable them to proceed with the rest of the paper.
Many quantum physics textbooks (e.g. [12] on which this discussion is partially based)
include discussions of “Stern-Gerlach” experiments. The quantum system is a single
particle that has some “spin” associated with it (think of a spinning top whose angular
motion is described by an axis and a rotational frequency). It is described how one can
measure the particle’s “spin” in some direction in space, by passing the particle briefly
through a magnetic field that is inhomogeneous (changes in strength) in the direction
in question. This changes the momentum of the particle along that direction by an
amount that is proportional to its spin. So if we say the particle starts off travelling in
the z-direction, and we want to know what it’s spin is in the x-direction, we allow it to
pass through a magnetic field that changes in the x-direction. For a particular sort of
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particle, a “spin-1/2” one, the particle will either get a nudge of a specific amount in the
x-direction or a nudge of the same amplitude but in the opposite, negative-x-direction.
The nudge should be proportional to the spin of the particle. This shows that the spin
of the particle along the x-direction can only take one of two discrete values, and hence
is quantized. Similarly, if one repeats the experiment with the magnetic field rotated to
change in the y-direction, one finds the spin in the y-direction is similarly quantized.
One can next consider two measurements, one after the other, by adding a second
magnetic field along each nudged path. Align both fields along each path to be inho-
mogeneous in the x-direction say. If the particle got a nudge in the positive-x direction
from the first magnet, it gets another nudge in the positive-x direction from the second
magnet. Likewise, if it got a nudge in the negative-x direction, it gets another nudge
that way. So, repeating the same measurement yields the same result.
Next though, rotate the second magnetic field along each path to measure the spin in
the y-direction with a new magnetic field. It now emerges with either a nudge in positive-
y direction or in the negative-y direction. If this two-step experiment is repeated many
times, the y-nudge appears to be statistically independent from the x-nudge.
One may now add a third magnetic field along each path. Let the first and third
magnets measure the spin in the x-direction, but the second measure the spin in the
y-direction. Repeating the experiment many times, the last x-nudge appears to be
statistically independent of both the preceding y-nudge and the first x-nudge! Indeter-
minacy appears to have entered physics and the Uncertainty Principle is well illustrated,
in this case between the x and y components of the particle’s spin.
Faced with these facts, one often breaks the quantum description of the particle’s
history into stages, three in this case, “streamlining” the description immediately after
each measurement to one in which the result was certain to have had emerged. By
fiat then, the next spin measurement becomes independent of results earlier than the
immediately preceding one.
But this is not necessary. Von Neumann [13] showed how a quantum description of
the system might be maintained by treating each measurement quantum-mechanically
rather than as a “jump” to a streamlined state. Here, the key fact is that electromag-
netism provides for an interaction between the spin of a particle and the magnetic field
it is in. A changing magnetic field gives the nudge discussed above, the stronger the gra-
dient the stronger the nudge. We need a sufficiently strong field in order to adequately
separate the two beams. The required strength is set by first imagining turning the field
to zero, when there would be no systematic nudge, whilst still keeping the apparatus in
place. There would still be a scatter of the particle’s motion, as though a random nudge
centred around zero with some width along the measurement direction was now applied,
however. This is a residual effect of the apparatus, it now just acting as a finite-sized
“aperture” or hole that the particle has to pass through. This spread is reminiscent
of the diffraction of a sound wave through a door, and indeed is the canonical illustra-
tion of both the “wave-particle” duality of quantum mechanics and of the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle: constraining a particle’s position in some direction necessarily in-
curs a spread in the “conjugate momentum” (proportional to its velocity) in that same
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direction. The smaller the aperture, the larger the spread.
With the field turned back on, there is both the systematic nudge parallel or antipar-
allel to the field direction on top of the diffractive spread. We need the field gradient to
be strong enough so that the systematic effect is larger than the spread in order to be
confident of the spin value and so effect a proper measurement of the spin (see e.g. [14]).
There is thus a minimal change in field strength from one side of aperture to the other
consistent with performing a spin measurement.
Now, electromagnetism tells us that a magnetic field has another effect, this time on
the spin itself of a particle: it causes the spin to precess, or rotate, around the magnetic
field direction, just as the axis of a spinning gyroscope rotates slowly around the earth’s
gravitational field direction. For a given time of exposure to the field, the total angle of
rotation is proportional to the field strength.
We are now finally in a position to see just how measuring the spin in the y-direction
affects the spin in the x-direction in between two x-measurements: as well as nudging the
particle, the y-magnet also causes the spin to precess around the y-direction, wanting to
change x-spin into z-spin and back whilst keeping the y-spin unchanged. But because the
field strength has to change across the aperture in order to effect a spin measurement,
the amount of rotation is not fixed, depending in a sense on the unknown details of the
particle’s path through the aperture. Indeed, it turns out that the minimal change in
field strength across the aperture required for a y-spin measurement is sufficient to lead
to at least a half-turn variation in the amount of spin rotation in the xz-plane, rendering
the x component of the spin unpredictable.
The interplay between spin measurements, considered quantummechanically through-
out, is consistent with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle applied directly to the spin
components, as one would expect. However, it is important to review the quantum de-
scription of the measurement process as we have just done in order to understand that
the uncertainty caused by “measurement” indeed has a physical basis. This allows us to
view the “streamlining” procedure, where the quantum effects of the measuring systems
are not explicitly taken into account but rather the quantum evolution of the system
in question is restarted afresh after each measurement, as an approximation to the full
quantum description. The difficulty of course is then in seeing how probabilities come
into the full quantum picture, an issue to which we shall return at the end of the next
section.
3 Operators, Lie Algebras and Gleason’s Theorem
From the above reflections on the nature of measurement from a quantum perspective,
we can see perhaps why the results of measurements have to be eigenvalues. A “mea-
surement” is a stable correlation of the property in question with something else, caused
by some interaction. The interaction thus has to involve the quantity being measured,
and hence different eigenvalues of the quantity correlate in different ways.
Let us now see how this helps our main business of improving inference in everyday
life. From quantum mechanics we carry over the idea of representing questions or propo-
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sitions by matrices. In physics we have seen that making a measurement corresponds
to applying an interaction to a system, changing it in certain ways. So we expect the
formalism to be at its most useful in situations where pushing for an answer to one
question can change the answer to another one. A moment’s reflection suggests such
situations are not too uncommon:
• getting one’s children to accept a common meal for dinner: does offering steak
affect the chances of them all accepting fish?
• deciding on a family day trip
• a person contemplating whom to ask on a date: does the very act of deciding to
come to a decision to ask A force him/her to reevaluate his/her feelings for B?
• a jury coming to a common decision: would coming to a conclusion on point B
after coming to a conclusion on point A reopen the discussion on point A?
• an advisory committee coming to a common position on one of a number of ques-
tions posed to it
• a government choosing how to respond to some provocation: war, sanctions or
appeasement?
• a negotiator trying to model how another entity might respond to different ap-
proaches
• an interrogator considering how to extract information from a subject
• tax/trade policies on economies
• an investor deciding which start-up to invest in
Many of these examples involve inter-entity communication. It is also interesting that
some examples are introspective, involving uncertainty within the questioner, whereas
others involve modelling external uncertainties. Some examples are passive, merely
wanting to correctly understand a situation, whereas others are more active, suggesting
courses of action (or influences on courses of action).
For a given problem we shall imagine we are posed with a number of different “ques-
tions” or “options”. Depending on the situation in hand, some of the questions may be
related to one another. For example, for an adult, broccoli, peas and sweetcorn might be
a truly independent choice of vegetables to consider, whereas for a young child, having
peas might be considered just a kind of intermediate case between having broccoli or
sweetcorn. Or, a selection committee for an academic might find itself effectively evalu-
ating each candidate by how much he or she fits in to one of a few existing groups within
a department and going from there. We shall denote the underlying dimensionality of
the “option space” by d.
5
To be able to use mathematics we need to associate numbers with potential answers or
outcomes: typically zero might correspond to “no preference”, a large positive number
to “strong agreement”, a small negative number to “weak disagreement” and so on.
Different people, groups or electorates might be able to return answers varying in subtlety
to the same sets of options; possible results might come in different representations.
So, we want to use the apparatus of quantum mechanics to address d “entwined”
options. Let us denote the options ti, i = 1, . . . , d. In the early editions of his seminal
book on quantum mechanics [15], Dirac showed how one could “build up” the quantum
description of a spinning particle simply from assuming the so-called commutation rela-
tions between the operators x, y and z representing the x-, y- and z- spin components:
xy − yx = iz,
yz− zy = ix,
zx− xz = iy. (1)
In quantum mechanics it is shown that operators that do not commute cannot be mea-
sured simultaneously. So the fact that no two components of the spin commute with
each other (i.e. the right hand sides are nonzero) corresponds to the fact that the spin-
components cannot be measured simultaneously. For this example, no talk of dynamics
is necessary, so it forms a particularly suitable starting point for our discussion. Dirac
shows that x2 + y2 + z2 (now called the quadratic Casimir operator) does commute
with each of x, y and z. Treating the operators as square matrices, one is able to find
two-by-two triples, three-by-three triples and so on to arbitrarily large dimension of ma-
trices that satisfy the commutation relations (1) and in which the Casimir operator is
proportional to the identity. The multiple of the Casimir over the identity increases with
the dimensionality dr of the representation (one using dr × dr matrices).
One might be puzzled about the non-uniqueness in the choice of matrices for a rep-
resentation of given dimensionality: it turns out for this problem that different choices
are equivalent, meaning that each of one set is given by pre- and post- multiplying the
corresponding one of the other set by some other matrix U and its inverse. By inspec-
tion though one can see that this preserves the commutation relations (1), and matrices
related in this manner have the same eigenvalues and so give the same spectrum of poten-
tial results for a measurement. (Later on we shall see an example in which inequivalent
representations do occur.) One can use this freedom to choose a representation in which
one of the three matrices representing the operators is diagonal; we can then just read
off its eigenvalues. (The rank is the number of operators that can be simultaneously
diagonalized, so here the rank is one.)
Note that one can find sets of matrices of some dimension that satisfy the com-
mutation relations but whose Casimir operator is not represented by a multiple of the
identity matrix. Such representations are called reducible though, since they can be ef-
fectively “built up” from combinations of the irreducible representations just described.
The spin-1/2 particle discussed in Sec. (2) above is described by the 2-dimensional irre-
ducible representation. A pair of such particles could be described by the product of two
such representations. This is reducible however into the sum of a one-dimensional and a
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three-dimensional representation. (The one-dimensional representation may be thought
of as a special case in which all operators are represented by zero, a trivial solution of
(1)).
So far we have focussed on the representation of the operators. Now let us turn to the
states the particles might be in. A given quantum spin state is represented by a column
vector of (generally complex-) numbers. The standard rules of quantum mechanics (see
Dirac [15]) tell us how to extract probabilities for measuring results from the column
vector. We return to the justification of these rules below.
It may seem strange at first that both prima facie different questions are related
to one another and that different states determining possible answers are related to
one another. Let us spend a few moments more on this point. In free space, no set
of axes is preferred over any other (an aspect of Lorentz invariance). So, rather than
choosing to use x, y and z as our base axes, we might for example choose axes x′,
y′ and z, rotated a few degrees around the z axis from our old ones. The operators
corresponding to measurements in the new spin directions will be linear combinations
of the old operators. (Physical rotation invariance is encoded by the conservation of the
commutation relations under the rotation.) Indeed, the operator for measuring the spin
component in any direction will be a linear combination of the x, y and z operators.
So questions are certainly decomposable into others, and the dimension of the question
space may well be finite, even though a continuous infinity of different questions might
be askable (corresponding in this example to all the directions in space along which
spin may be measured). Now consider the answers a state represents. If the state
represents certainty of a particular answer to a particular question, the state vector will
be the eigenvector corresponding to the particular answer or eigenvalue of the matrix
representing the question. An eigenvector of one matrix is not normally an eigenvector
of another matrix that does not commute with the first. So the state does not normally
correspond to a definite answer to a second question also. However, an eigenvector of the
first matrix can be expressed as a complex-number-weighted sum of eigenvectors of the
second, and vice versa. So, for the spin-1/2 particle of (2), spinning in the +y direction
is a particular superposition of spinning in the −x and +x directions and so on. Indeed,
it is worth bearing in mind that Dirac stressed that the superposition principle is one
of the great simplifications of quantum mechanics over classical mechanics and that it
is actually allowed in by indeterminacy.
The example above, emerging remarkably out of Eqs. (1), seems to set an ideal
precedent for what we would like to do for our everyday inference and decision making.
However, it only can be applicable for cases with dimensionality d = 3. Fortunately,
Eqs. (1) simply define a particular case of what is generally known as a Lie algebra,
the mathematical understandings of which are mature. Indeed, the description above
has been purposely shaped with an eye to moving to a general compact simple Lie
algebra. The technical conditions of compactness and simplicity ensure that suitable
finite dimensional matrix representations can be found (see e.g. [16]). Compactness
basically corresponds to only having a “finite-volume”’s worth of questions to consider
(in the example given above, think of the sphere’s worth of potential spin measurements
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as opposed to say an infinite plane’s worth of measurement options). Simplicity roughly
means that the algebra has already been “broken down” as much as possible. One can
then consider other Lie algebras by “summing up” combinations of compact simple ones
(along with “U(1)” Lie algebras that we have not discussed here).
The compact simple Lie algebras were completely classified by the end of the 19th
Century. There are four general families, each of them parametrized by an integer n,
denoted an, bn, cn and dn (or alternatively su(n+1), o(2n+1), usp(2n) and o(2n)), with
only a few isomorphisms or overlaps (a1 = b1 = c1, c2 = b2, and a3 = d3). One needs
n ≥ 1 for the first three, and n ≥ 3 for the last. n gives the rank of a representation, and
the dimensions d are given by n(n+2), n(2n+1), n(2n+1) and n(2n− 1) respectively.
There are also five “exceptional” cases, denoted g2, f4, e6, e7 and e8, the subscript
indicating the rank, and these have dimension 14, 52, 78, 133 and 248 respectively.
Generalizing (1), the operators or generators ta can be chosen to satisfy:
[ta, tb] = ifabctc (2)
where fabc are called the structure constants of the algebra. The ta’s may be taken to
be Hermitian traceless matrices (often conventionally normalized to satisfy tr (tatb) =
δab/2), the commutator [ta, tb] is shorthand for tatb − tbta, and repeated indices are
implicitly summed over. The structure constants are real and are antisymmetric in all
three indices. They are constrained by the Jacobi identity,
[[ta, tb], tc] + [[tb, tc], ta] + [[tc, ta], tb] = 0 (3)
that must hold by virtue of the definition of the commutator and the associativity of
matrix multiplication.
The structure constants define a dr = d-dimensional representation, called the adjoint
representation, with
(tAa )bc = −ifabc (4)
(i.e. the bc’th component of the a’th matrix is given by −i times the indicated structure
constant). The adjoint representation is not the only one that exists, and is not usually
the smallest either. In fact one may construct “fundamental” representations and then
“build up” higher dimensional representations from the fundamental one(s), see e.g.
[9, 17], so one can label representations by the numbers of each of the fundamental
representations they involve. One may construct higher-order analogues C3, C4, . . .
of the quadratic Casimir operator C2 and use suitable sets of these values to label
representations also.
Given one set of matrices forming a representation of (2), one can form another set
of matrices by taking the negative complex conjugate of each element of each of them,
since (2) implies:
[(−t∗a), (−t∗b)] = ifabc(−t∗c). (5)
The new matrices may or may not form an equivalent representation, in the sense de-
scribed above, to the original set. As an equivalent matrix has the same eigenvalues as
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the original one, if any matrix in the original set has eigenvalues that are not symmetric
around zero, then the two representations must be inequivalent.
Now that we have reviewed all the Lie theory we shall need, let us now turn back
to the question of interpretation. In quantum mechanics proper there are multiple
arguments for the standard rules for obtaining probabilities from the formalism, e.g.
[15, 5, 18]. There is the issue though that a probabilistic theory could be describing
an approximation to a reality in which probabilities do not fundamentally appear, e.g.
[3]. For our application though this difficulty does not apply since our whole purpose
is to calculate probabilities. Then, given we want the Lie algebra-type structure and
to represent questions by matrices, perhaps the most compelling argument comes from
Gleason’s Theorem. This theorem tells us that the standard scheme is basically the only
one way to consistently link probabilities to operators, at least in a representation of
dimension dr > 2 and as long as we want the probability for a given outcome of any
question to be independent of “rotations” between the other outcomes we might have
received. The standard scheme of course works for dr = 2 and we continue to use it in
this case, even if it is not still proven to be unique. Strictly, Gleason’s Theorem shows
that a “density matrix” description of the system must exist, which can be thought of
as a classical probability distribution over pure quantum states (see e.g. [19]). In this
work we shall assume we can describe a system by a pure state. See the discussion in
[6] for a forceful advocation of the role of Gleason’s Theorem in deriving probability in
quantum mechanics.
In conclusion, the framework of identifying matrix generators of Lie algebra repre-
sentations with questions or options and then modelling a system and extracting prob-
abilities from it just as in quantum mechanics seems to be a secure way to reason about
everyday life. We now turn to an example treatment of a situation in this maner.
4 A Drink, Sir/Madam?
Imagine you are a restaurant owner, and wish to serve clients drinks. Knowing your
varying stock levels, profit margins or simply for speed, you may wish to “steer” each of
the diners towards certain options, simply by asking each of them if they would like a
particular drink rather than asking them for a general preference.
Hence it would be helpful to have a model in mind of how people might respond
to being asked about a drink. Children might be expected to have a simpler taste and
so need a lower dimensional “space” of drink possibilities compared to an adult (i.e. a
lower d for children). They might also have a simple like/dislike response whereas adults
might express more subtle preferences. So we expect children to have a lower dimensional
representation space of answers than for adults (i.e. a lower dr for children). Children
might only have one drink in mind they’d definitely accept, whereas adults might have
two or more drinks they’d definitely accept (i.e. a lower rank n for children). Reflecting
on one’s own experiences when out for dinner, and looking at the differences in the child
and adult menu options, might attest to the relevance of these considerations!
The rank n and dimensionality d of potential algebras and the dimensionality dr
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of potential representations are often helpful to keep in mind when determining which
algebra to try. For a single child, we shall consider su(2), and for a single adult we shall
consider su(3).
4.1 su(2)
This algebra has three generators, which for illustration we can take to be:
t1: cola? t2: apple juice? t3: water?
Asking a child about a different drink, e.g. lemonade, should then be thought of as a
superposition of asking him or her about these three drinks, say between cola and water.
As the rank is one, such a child can have a definite opinion about only one drink at a
time.
Now let us consider which representation to use. The lowest nontrivial representation
has dr = 2, so let us consider that one first. Responses can only be for/against. The
superposition principle tells us that a child who’d definitely have cola may or may not
have water with equal probability.
Now imagine we have two children, trying to decide on a jug of drink to share. If
each of them are in the dr = 2 representation, then combined they can either disagree
about any option or agree strongly about an option. Indeed, a product of two dr = 2
representations reduces to the sum of the one-dimensional and three-dimensional irre-
ducible ones. If a younger child and an older child are together, the older child might
offer a stronger but more refined view (strong like/no preference/strong dislike). In this
case, the product of a dr = 2 and a dr = 3 representation turn out to combine to the
sum of a dr = 2 one (weak preference) and a dr = 4 one. Here we have assumed the
children are asked independently. If however the younger child is scared of the older one,
he or she might not respond and the correct description of the combined system might
just be that of the older child alone.
4.2 su(3)
Now let us consider adults in su(3). This algebra has eight generators and has rank two.
Conventionally t3 and t8 are chosen to commute, and the nonzero structure constants
are set by f123 = 1, f147 = f246 = f257 = f345 = 1/2, f156 = f367 = −1/2 and
f458 = f678 =
√
3/2. Diners will often accept water without prejudicing a decision to
also have an alcoholic drink for example, so we reflect this in our association of generators
with questions:
t1: wine? t2: whisky? t3: beer? t4: coffee?
t5: tea? t6: lemonade? t7: cola? t8: water?
Asking about champagne might be linear combination of asking about lemonade and
wine, mainly along the wine direction say. So if the restaurateur overhears a person
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expressing a desire for a glass of champagne perhaps but the last bottle has already
gone, he or she might do well to ask that person about a glass of wine. For certain
drinkers, questioning about lager might be the negative of questioning about beer.
su(3) is more subtle than su(2) in that it has representations in only certain dimen-
sions, and has inequivalent representations for certain of those dimensions too. Indeed,
its lowest nontrivial representations are in dimension three, and there are two inequiv-
alent ones. These are typically denoted by 3 and 3¯, and the (single) eight dimensional
representation is the adjoint one denoted 8. The Casimir operator C2 = 4/3 for 3 and
3¯, and C2 = 3 for 8, indicating the increasing range of feeling expressible as one goes to
higher dimension representations. In the 3 representation, any state can be expressed
as a combination of the simultaneous eigenvectors of t3 and t8 with the following com-
binations of eigenvalues:
t3 : −1/2 0 1/2
t8 : 1/(2
√
3) −2/(2
√
3) 1/(2
√
3).
These eigenvectors also have definite values of I2 ≡ t21 + t22 + t23 of 3/4, 0 and 3/4
respectively. The other t’s can have the eigenvalues −1/2, 0 or 1/2.
In the 3¯ representation, any state can be expressed as a combination of the simulta-
neous eigenvectors of t3 and t8 with the following combinations of eigenvalues:
t3 : −1/2 0 1/2
t8 : −1/(2
√
3) 2/(2
√
3) −1/(2
√
3).
Again, these eigenvectors also have definite values of I2 of 3/4, 0 and 3/4 respectively,
and the other t’s can have the eigenvalues −1/2, 0 or 1/2.
We see the asymmetry of the allowable strengths of preferences for and against water
in the two representations, and how this couples to any desire for alcohol (given by I2).
The adjoint representation by contrast is more democratic:
t3 : −1 −1/2 −1/2 0 0 1/2 1/2 1
t8 : 0 −
√
3/2
√
3/2 0 0 −
√
3/2
√
3/2 0
with I2’s of 2, 3/4, 3/4, 0, 3/4, 3/4, 3/4, and 2 respectively (the value of I2 happening
to distinguish the two eigenvectors with the same eigenvalues for t3 and t8). The other
t’s share the same eigenvalues as t3 (but not simultaneously).
Combinations of desires now join interestingly also. For example, a couple consisting
of two 3’s would reduce to the sum of the 6 representation and a 3¯ representation,
whereas a 3 and a 3¯ would reduce to the sum of the adjoint and the one-dimensional
representation. If a couple’s preferences both fall into the adjoint representation, their
independent summed responses are reducible into the sum of the 27 representation, the
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10 and the 10 representations, two copies of the adjoint representation and the one-
dimensional representation.
Of course, the pair in a couple might take each other’s preference into account before
responding jointly to the restaurateur, and so their combined response might fall into a
single representation.
By considering all these factors, a restaurateur should be able to optimize his or
her drinks offerings for both adult and child clients in a number of situations. One
interesting problem would be how to model thinking about a common drink for a family,
if members of the family would not individually fall into the same algebra. Perhaps the
adults instinctively “drop down” to the children’s level. Restaurateurs also might have
some experience in how people respond if they have chosen one drink which then turns
out to be unavailable. Does the second response indeed follow the quantum probability
predictions?
It would be interesting and should be possible to perform an analysis on restaurant
receipts to investigate at least some of the questions, particularly if one would be pre-
pared to do tests on differing ways of presenting options to customers at self-serve fast
food ordering points for example.
5 Further Work
5.1 Testing the Predictions
As just suggested, there is plenty of scope for testing the predictions of this approach,
and there might exist plenty of “big data” sets that confirm such behaviour in certain
situations, if only one can identify the appropriate questions to consider together.
In the above example, a simple observation is that many set menus for children
offer a choice of three meals, three desserts and three drinks, presumably trying to span
the space of acceptability for most children in the minimal way (the author’s children
certainly often behave as spin-1/2 particles with regards to their culinary preferences1).
A very basic consistency check is that if the exact same question is simply repeated
(for example if the answer was inaudible), one should expect to receive the same answer.
This is what the standard quantum formalism gives, the state of the system after mea-
surement being given by the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue representing
the measurement result.
5.2 Extending the Maths
The mapping of preferences onto specific real numbers (the eigenvalues of a matrix
representing the question) doesn’t always feel totally natural: things seem less clear
cut for relative strengths of feelings say than for spin components. For a given system,
perhaps one should view such a mapping merely as a device, much as with the relation
1A humorous puzzle for physicist parents: can children somehow manage to disagree on dinner even
whilst being spacelike separated and thus violate the Bell inequalities? Hidden variables or superluminal
communication perhaps?!
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between “plausibilities” and “probabilities” in the construction of Bayesian inference
[1]. When systems are “combined” however it seems important that both have the same
“scale” of interpretation, in order say that a like and dislike precisely cancel.
Such discussions might remind one of “symmetry breaking” in particle physics, and
it would be natural to search for analogous situations in everyday life. Indeed particle
physics with its “eightfold way”, uncovering the importance of su(3) in understanding
hadron spectroscopy [20], was a motivating inspiration for the scheme presented here.
Above we argued that Lie algebras seem the perfect fit for our need of generating
matrices to represent options that should be considered together and can be combined or
rotated into new ones. Generalizations of Lie algebras do exist and are useful in physics,
for example Lie superalgebras as used in supersymmetry. It would be interesting to see
for which if any situations a superalgebra treatment might be appropriate.
It is not always immediately clear how to interpret certain outcomes. In the child’s
drink example above, consider the negative of the matrix representing a question about
water. Can this just be a query about “not-water”, or does it have to be a query about
another drink, orange juice say?
If for some situation only a fixed set of questions makes sense, rather than a contin-
uous array of possibilities, perhaps finite groups and their representations can replace
Lie algebras and their representations. Indeed, finite simple groups have recently also
been completely classified, and just as for Lie algebras there are a number of countable
infinite families of them along with a collection of “sporadic” ones.
5.3 Applications and Implications
It might behove one to respect, rather than to possibly unwittingly try and fight, an
underlying Lie algebra structure to a situation if indeed it is there. This would involve
ensuring that one frame one’s problems in an appropriate dimension, adding an imagi-
nary company or two to an accelerator investment discussion for example, or considering
some candidates as linear combinations of others if that effectively represents a job search
committee’s inner workings for example. It would also ensure making sure one chooses
an appropriate representation, particularly if there are inequivalent ones with the the
same dr. Menu or questionnaire design could clearly be influenced. For example, Likert-
type scales [21], measuring attitudes in some discrete manner (e.g. “1=strongly disagree
. . . 5=strongly agree”), seem to correspond well with the discrete eigenvalues of finite-
dimensional operators. But when two (or more) questions are asked, certain algebras
and representations suggest one should not necessarily use the “direct product” of such
one-dimensional scales but might rather need a higher-dimensional lattice of responses,
even when the questions commute (consider the allowed t3 and t8 responses in su(3) as
discussed above). In fact, restricting possible outputs/responses might be considered as
a device that compels a person/system to fit into some representation.
Perhaps people should be able to vote either for or also against a candidate of their
choice in elections, more closely corresponding to the su(2) structure of a two-way choice
(unless a preference against one candidate happens to be identical to a preference for
another one). It would be fascinating to do research on what sorts of effects this would
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have, perhaps leading to a more satisfied electorate with an easier way to remove bad
leaders and so to correct errors [22].
Recent work on machine translation using neural networks, building on earlier ideas
of representing words in a vector space [23], has suggested that it is profitable to com-
press sentences expressed in one language into “sentence vectors”, which can then be
decompressed into another language [24]. This suggests that thoughts themselves may
occupy a sort of vector space in O(1000) dimensions [25]. It would be fascinating to see if
these insights from deep learning can be combined with the ideas presented in this work
to understand reasoning quantum mechanically. For example, the thought vector space
might “factorize” into products of representations of Lie algebras. Correspondingly, one
might find e.g. translation works particularly well if one demands the thought vector
space to be built up in this manner and goes on to use the quantum rule for probability
to interpret it.
Then, “thinking” about some topic could actually best be represented by a matrix,
with definitely having certain thoughts then being represented by thought eigenvectors
(the vector space becoming a Hilbert space). The impossibility of holding at least cer-
tain beliefs simultaneously (non-commutation of thoughts) would then emerge naturally.
The simplification that the superposition principle brings in organising possibilities and
reducing the dimensionality of the problem would presumably be very helpful. Indeed,
if the brain does actually work in something approximating this manner, evolution hav-
ing selected for such efficiency, the brain could then be said to be behaving quantum
mechanically, though not of course in the sense in which this phrase might have been
used before2.
Finally, the efficiency and other gains that a quantum approach bring might not be
limited solely to the human brain. It ought to be possible for artificial intelligence to
also reap the benefits. Relating questions to one another should reduce the need for
retraining (e.g. a new “is it a guinea pig?” question to some image classifier might just
be a linear combination of the already-trained-for “is it a cat?” and “is it a mouse?”
questions, requiring no further training). The natural output of an analysis would be the
state vector, implicitly containing probabilistic answers to all askable questions.3 The
answer to any such question would be one of a discrete set of values, with probabilities
ensuring a caution or “tolerance” [27] built into any inference. Given the complete
classification of Lie algebras, a certain commonality or universality between problems
might be exploitable also; once one has solved some problem matching on to say su(4),
solving another su(4) problem might be straightforward, and going on to solve a problem
2For related points of view see the introductory text on quantum cognition [8] mentioned in the
introduction and references therein. Also note Ref. [26] which investigates ways in which it is possible
for neural networks to implement such calculations.
3One might further speculate on implications of a quantum viewpoint onto the very construction of
approaches to machine learning. For example, rather than combining and passing real numbers from
layer to layer of a network, perhaps one should use mini state vectors transforming under representations
of a Lie algebra, composing appropriately at each input stage and perhaps “measured” for each output.
Note that this would be distinct from using quantum computers to speed up training for current network
designs.
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matching on to su(5) might not be so difficult either.
5.4 Counterpart to Unitary Evolution
As a quantum system interacts, its state evolves with time, as we saw when discussing
magnetic fields causing procession of the spin axis of a particle. Thus, before making
a measurement, one can control the evolution of a system in a previously known state
to make a given outcome more or less likely. In everyday life this might correspond to
a restaurateur, knowing a particular client would like a glass of white wine say, drops
hints about how nice the rose´ is before asking if the client would indeed like the rose´ he
or she is trying to clear.
Most people might naturally use low-dimensional representations for many issues.
Advertising and marketing might effectively correspond to unitary evolution before a
measurement process such as a purchase decision or a vote. Determining if such analogies
exist and recognizing them if they do might lead one to more effective public information
campaigns for example. The recent Brexit vote in the UK, see e.g. [28, 29], might make
an interesting case study for the first part of this at least.
Given the option of providing a quantum description of the measurement process in
physics, it is of interest to consider parallels to this in quantum inference. The interaction
term in the Hamiltonian, which provides the quantum description by correlating one
observable with another, might correspond to a “policy” for putting thoughts into action.
For example, alternately applying to a state vector a term coupling “should I turn the
steering wheel clockwise?” to the question “should I turn right?” and a term coupling
“should I accelerate?” to “is it clear in front?” and so on might form the basis for a
self-driving car implementation. Giving an option to steer clockwise then “measures” a
desire to turn right and an option to accelerate “measures” whether there is plenty of
space in front. Non-commutation between the thoughts would then naturally express
how for example actions taken in response to one thought force other thoughts to be
reconsidered.
6 Summary
This work points out how the treatment of quantum-mechanical reasoning as presented
by Dirac may be applicable to situations in everyday life. The representation theory of
Lie algebras guides us in organising both sets of questions and answers in an appropriate
way. Gleason’s theorem gives us confidence that we are extracting numerical probabilities
from the formalism in an appropriate manner.
As alluded to in Sec. (3) above, in Ref. [15], Dirac says of quantum mechanics that
“there remains an overall criticism . . . that in departing from . . . determinacy . . . a great
complication is introduced . . . which is a highly undesirable feature. This complication
is undeniable, but it is offset by a great simplification, provided by the general principle
of superposition of states . . . ”. For applications to inference however, we consider both
a lack of determinacy and a superposition principle to be desirable features, enabling
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responses to include uncertainty and allowing for analysis reuse.
It would be interesting to investigate how widely and how precisely these ideas actu-
ally represent the real life behaviour of people and organisations, whether they can aid us
in advancing machine learning, and to see if such a structure is helpful in understanding
thought and meaning in human and artificial intelligence.
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